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Massachusetts v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).

Like most states' and the federal government,2 Massachusetts
grants a preference to veterans 3 seeking public employment. Unlike
most states, however, the Massachusetts veterans' preference is "absolute;"' a veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be

1 The majority of states grant a veterans' preference in connection with public employment

appointments, although the form of the preference varies greatly. Anthony v, Mass., 415 F.
2
Supp. 485, 502 n. (D. Mass. 1976). Most states grant "point preferences" which allow veterans
to add a statutory number of points to the grade received on civil service examinations. Fleming
& Shanor, Veterans Preferences in Public Employment: Unconstitutional Gender Discrimination? 26 EmorY L.J. 13, 16-J7 (1977). Sec e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-2-18 (Burns 1976);
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW.'.§ 85 (McKinney 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
Other states grant a tie-breaking preference to veterans who score equally with nonveterans
on civil service examination. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-30-210 (Cum. Supp. 1973); TEx,
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (31) §§ (1) & (3) (Vernon 1976).
Only seven states grant a so-called "absolute preference" which requires that veterans who
pass the examination be considered for appointment before qualified nonveterans. Fleming &
Shanor at 16-17. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 11:27-4 (West 1976) (affording absolute preference to veterans certified as among three
candidates of highest standing); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104 (Purdon 1976); S.D. CoMP.
LAWSs ANN. § 3-3-1 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-30-11 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1543
(1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 73.16.010 (1978).
2 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2286 n.6 (1979).
a MASS. ANN. LAW's ch. 31, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979). The statute provides:
The names of persons who pass examinations for appointment to any position in the
official service shall be placed on eligible lists in the following order: (1) disabled
veterans, in the order of their respective standings; (2) veterans, in the order of
their respective standings; (3) widows or widowed mothers of veterans who were
killed in action or died from a service connected disability incurred in wartime
service, in the order of their respective standings; (4) all others, in the order of
their respective standings. Upon receipt of a requisition, names shall be certified
from such lists according to the method of certification prescribed by the [civil

service] rules.
Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 43 (West 1976) defines "veteran" as
any person, male or female, including a nurse, (a) whose last discharge or release
... was under honorable conditions and who (b) served in the army, navy, marine
corps, coast guard, or air force of the United States for not less than ninety days
active service, at least one day of which was for wartime service ...
Id.
Traditionally, veterans' preference laws have been enacted to reward veterans for the sacrifice of militarv service, to compensate for the disruption of personal life, to ease reentry into
civilian life, to encourage military service, and to attract patriotic, disciplined persons to public
office. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2288 (1979).
4 See note 3 supra.
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considered for employment before qualified non-veterans. 5 The
preference may be invoked repeatedly by a veteran, 6 and operates
overwhelmingly to the benefit of males. 7
-Helen B. Feeney, a non-veteran citizen of Massachusetts, was
employed in the state civil service system for twelve years8 prior to
her dismissal in 1975.9 During that time, she passed nine civil service examinations. 10 In each instance, because of the veterans' preference, she was ranked behind male veterans, most of whom had
lower scores than she. Consequently, Feeney was never certified nor
considered for the positions sought. 1
s Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2287 (1979).
To be appointed to a permanent position in the classified official service, an applicant must
pass an examination designed to evaluate relative ability to perform the job for which the
examinaton is given. Brief for Appellee at 5, Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct.
2282 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. Grades are based on a formula which gives
weight to training and experience as well as to test results. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2287 (1979). Candidates who pass examinations are ranked according to
their scores on an "eligible list." Id.
When a public agency has a vacancy, it requests a list of candidates from the state personnel division. A group of applicants from the top of the eligible list are "certified" as eligible for
the position. The appointing agency must choose from among these applicants, id. at 2288,
although it need not choose the highest-scoring applicant. Brief for Appellee at 6.
In the case of more desirable, nonclerical positions, which offer higher grades and higher
salaries, the absolute veterans' preference operates to concentrate veterans at the top of the
eligible list. See note 3 supra. "[A]lthough the veterans' preference does not guarantee that a
veteran will be appointed, it is obvious that the preference gives to veterans who achieve passing scores a well-nigh absolute advantage." Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct.
2282, 2288 (1979).
6 Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 7.
7 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2285 (1979). When the legislation
was enacted, "over 98% of Massachusetts veterans were male [while] only 1.8% were female."
Id. at 2291. From 1963 to 1973, when Feenev was active in the civil service, 43% of those
appointed to permanent positions were women. virtually all of the female appointees, however,
held lower grade, low paying secretarial or other clerical positions of little interest to male
applicants. Anthony v. Mass., 415 F. Supp. 485, 498 (D. Mass. 1976).
S Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2288 (1979). Feenev entered the
Massachusetts civil service system in 1963 after successfully competing for the position of Senior
Clerk Stenographer in the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. Four years later, she was promoted to Federal Funds and Personnel Coordinator within that Agency. Id.
9 Id. The Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency was dissolved in 1975. Id.
10 Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 8.
"1 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2288 (1979). Although Feeney
received very high scores on several examinations, her efforts to secure an administrative position were constantly frustrated by the operation of the veterans' preference. Id. In 1971,
Feeney was tested for appointment as Assistant Secretary, Board of Dental Examiners. Her
score of 86.68 would have placed her second on the eligible list and assured her of certification.
However, five lower-scoring veterans were placed ahead of her and a lower-scoring veteran was
eventually appointed. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 9. In 1973, Feeney was tested for
appointment as Head Administrative Assistant, Solomon Mental Health Center. Twelve male
veterans, eleven of whom had lower scores, were placed ahead of her on the eligible list. But
for the preference, Feeney would have placed third. Id.
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Feeney brought suit in federal district court, 12 seeking a permanent injunction against the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute. 13 She alleged that the absolute preference "inevitably operated
to exclude women from consideration" for high level civil service
positions and thus violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 14 The district court agreed that the challenged
statute was unconstitutional and enjoined its operation. 15 Finding no
purposeful discrimination against women, 16 the district court called
the state's goal of rexvarding veterans "worthy."'

17

Nevertheless, the

law's impact on women -washeld to be so severe that the Constitution
required a more limited form of preference. "I
The Massachusetts Attorney General appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the

judgment

l1

and remanded it for further consideration in light of

Washington v. Davis, 20 an intervening decision. In Davis, the Su-

preme Court had held that a neutral law does not necessarily violate
the equal protection clause simply because it results in a "racially
disproportionate impact;" the impact must be linked to a purposeful
discrimination.

21

In MaN of 1974, Feenev was examined for several administrative assistant positions. Although her score would have tied her for 17th. application of the veterans' preference relegated
her to 70th place. Id.
12 See note 9 supra.
13 Anthony v. Mass., 415 F. Supp. 485, 487 (D. Mass. 1976). Feeney brought the action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its Division
of Civil Service, the Director of Civil Service and the members of the Massachusetts Civil
Service Commission. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 2. No claim was brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 due to the presence of a saving clause exempting veterans'
preference laws from operation of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 (1970).
Feeney's case was consolidated with a similar action brought by Carol Anthony, an attorney
whose efforts to secure a civil service position had been blocked by operation of the preference.
Anthony v. Mass., 415 F. Supp. 485, 488-90 (D. Mass. 1976).
14 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2285 (1979).
11 Anthony v. Mass., 415 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D. Mass. 1976).
16 Id. at 496.

Id. at 499.
'8 Id. Soon after the case was decided, chapter 31. § 23 was passed, establishing an interim
17

point preference which would operate until Feeney's case was decided by the Supreme Court.
Supp. 1978-1979).
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (\Vest Cui.
'9 Feeney v. Mass., 434 U.S. 884 (1977).
20 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21 Id. at 238-39. The Supreme Court held that a law is not "unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact." Id. at 239. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant,
but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the ConstituId. at 242.
tion. Standing alone, [it] does not trigger . . . the strictest scrutiny.
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On remand, a divided district court reaffirmed its holding for
Feeney. 22 In his majority opinion, Judge Tauro held that the Massachusetts legislature had "intentionally sacrific[ed] the career opportunities of its women in order to benefit veterans." 23 He reasoned
that the consequences of the law were too inevitable to have been
24
unintended.
The Massachusetts Attorney General again appealed 2 5 directly to
the Supreme Court. In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 26 Justice Stewart held that the Massachusetts absolute veterans' preference did not unconstitutionally discriminate against
women. 2 7 Justice Stewart ruled that Feeney had failed to demonstrate that a gender-based discriminatory purpose had shaped the
Massachusetts veterans' preference legislation "at least in some mea8
sure." 2
When considering claims brought under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has attached importance to both discriminatory intent 29 and discriminatory impact. 30 It
was not until the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Washington v.
Davis
22

31

that the impact/intent standards were linked. In Davis, re-

Feeney v. Mass., 451 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D. Mass. 1978). Judge Murray dissented,

reiterating his belief that the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute is facially neutral, unmotivated by discriminatory intent. Id. at 152-53 (Murray, J., dissenting).
23 Id.
at 150. In his concurrence, Judge Campbell wrote: "'The veterans' preference law
prefers an already established class which, as a matter of historical fact, is 98% male. . . . The
law was sexually skewed from the outset .. " 1d. (Campbell, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 150. According to Judge Campbell, the law's exclusionar v impact on "'women was
not merely predictable but absolutely inescapable and 'built-in.' " Id. (Campbell, J., concurring).
He attributed to the legislature an intent to disadvantage women in the course of aiding veterans. -[T]he cutting-off of women's opportunities was an inevitable concomitant of the chosen
scheme-as inevitable as the proposition that if tails is sip, heads must be down." id.
(Campbell, J., concurring).
25 Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979). The appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
26 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).
27 Id. at 2292-93, 2297.
28 1d. at 2294, 2297.
29 In Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), a decrease in the number of registered black voters following introduction of an "interpretation" test was held to indicate discriminatory intent on the part of the legislature. Id. at 151. The Court recognized that the test
"was part of a successful plan to deprive" blacks of the franchise. Id. And in Keyes v. School
District, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court ruled that the petitioners bore the burden of proving
that segregation "was brought about or maintained by intentional state action." Id. at 198.
30 Weighing the constitutionality of a school redistricting plan in Wright v. City Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), Justice Stewart said, "[wie have focused upon the effect-not
the purpose or motivation-of [the] school board's action." Id. at 462. See also Gaston County
v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1968) (drop in number of black voters result of unequal educational opportunities).
31 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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jected black applicants to the District of Columbia police department
claimed that a written test used to evaluate applicants was racially
discriminatory and violative of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 32 They asserted that the test was unrelated to job performance and operated to exclude a disproportionately high number
of blacks. a3
Rejecting this contention, the Court held that "[dlisproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious
discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, [dis'' s
proportionate impact] does not trigger . . . the strictest scrutiny.
To invalidate the challenged statute, it would be necessary to show
discriminatory intent. 35
One year later, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corporation,36 Justice Powell expanded upon the Davis opinion by
discussing factors relevant to demonstrating discriminatory intent. A
black plaintiff challenged the refusal of Arlington Heights to alter zoning ordinances to permit the building of low and middle income housing. 3 7 The Supreme Court reversed a holding for plaintiff and
remanded in light of Davis. 38 Recognizing 'the necessity for "a sensitive inquiry," 3 9 Justice Powell discussed "historical background,"
"legislative history" and the "sequence of events leading up to the
challenged action" as factors relevant to a determination of discriminatory intent. 40
These factors could prove revealing in examining the effect of
state veterans' preference legislation and military policy on women.
The number of women eligible for benefits under veterans' preference laws is directly related to military policies concerning female
recruits. 41 Traditionally, opportunities for women in the armed
forces have been severely limited by an extensive body of restrictions. 42 Although they have served in the armed forces in auxiliary
capacities since World War I, women were not granted veteran status

32 Id. at 232-33.
33 Id. at 233.
34 Id. at 242.

35 Id.
36 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

37 Id. at 264.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See
42 See

at 265, 271.
at 266.
at 267.
note 3 supra.
generally Beans, Sex Discrimination in the Military, 67 MIL. LA\V REV. 19 (1977);

Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533 (1973).
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until 1948.43 From that date until very recently, the number of
female recruits was limited to two percent of total enlistment. 4
Certain inroads have been made towards equalization of opportunitv for servicewomen. The military, however, has maintained a
tradition of inhospitality toward women. 4
Few women have been
able to achieve the status required to take advantage of veterans'
benefits, 46 including those available under veterans' preference laws.
The Massachusetts veterans' preference statute not only incorporates the range of military sex-discriminatory policies, but has consistently treated men and women differently. The law has been revised
repeatedly to bring within its ambit veterans of successive wars and
conflicts,

47

Each time the statute was presented for reconsideration,

the legislature manifested its intent that men and women be treated
differently with regard to job opportunities by reenacting the preference in absolute, sex-specific form. Statutory language which required
that, "[ulpon receipt of a requisition not especially calling for women,
names [Would] be certified" from eligible lists,48 remained on the
books until 1971.49 The absolute nature of the preference, however,
was never altered. The largely male class of veterans continued, and
still continues, to displace the largely female class of nonveterans
from desirable civil service positions.

4' The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 625, 62 Stat. 356375, permanently established the women's services and granted servicewomen full veteran
status.
44 99 S. Ct. at 2291 n.22. The 2% quota was lifted in 1967. Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-130, § 1(b), 81 Stat. 376. The Armv continued to maintain a 2% limitation on the
number of female enlistees until the Women's Army Corps was abolished in October, 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-485, § 820, 92 Stat. 1627 (1978).
4- Until 1967, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act placed ceilings on the ranks
attainable by female volunteers. Members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC's) could progress
no higher than lieutenant colonel. Pub. L. No. 625, 62 Stat. 358 (1948). Women in the Navy
and Marine Corps were limited to the ranks of lieutenant commander. Id. at 62 Stat. 364.
Members of the Women's Air Force (WAF's) were restricted to a maximum rank of lieutenant
colonel. Id. at 62 Stat. 371.
1 When litigation in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney commenced, only 1.8% of all
Massachusetts veterans were women. 99 S. Ct. at 2291. The federal district court in Anthony v.
Mass., 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), considered the total exclusion of women from the
armed services until 1918, the exclusion of all women except nurses from the military after
World War I until 1942, and the limitation of servicewomen to 2% of the armed forces from
1948 until 1967 and concluded that "[flew women will ever become veterans." Id. at 489-90.
41 See 1943 Mass. Acts, ch. 194; 1949 Mass. Acts, ch. 642. § 2 (World War I1); 1954 Mass.
Acts, ch. 627 (Korea); 1968 Mass. Acts, ch. 531 § 2 (Vietnam).
The general Massachusetts Civil Service Law was recodified on January 1, 1979, and is now
found at MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 31, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1979).
" 99 S. Ct. at 2289 n.14.
49 Id.
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The Feeney Court was heavily influenced by Davis and Arlington
Heights. Although discriminatory intent must be linked to disparate
impact, 50 the Court interpreted the latter two cases as permitting an
inference that "when a neutral law has a disparate impact upon a
group that has historically been the victim of discrimination, an un51
constitutional purpose may . . . be at work."
Faced with a neutral statute challenged as having a disparate effect on women, the Feeney Court used a two-fold test to arrive at an
appropriate standard of review. 52 First, the Court considered
whether the statute was truly neutral in that it was not overtly or
covertly gender-based. If found to be neutral, the second inquiry was
whether the adverse effect on women reflected invidious genderbased discrimination. 53
Dealing summarily with the first arm of the test, the majority
accepted the lower court's finding and Feeney's concession that the
statute was neutral on its face. 54 Satisfied that the statute was indeed gender-neutral, the Court declared that too many males were
ineligible for the preference to force the conclusion that the statute
was a pretext for favoring males over females. 55 However, the Court
admitted that the statute exhibited an undeniably adverse impact on
women. 56 Consequently, the second arm of the test commanded
more detailed analysis, as the Court sought to determine whether
Feeney had shown that "a gender-based discriminator\, purpose ha[d]
at least in some measure shaped the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute. '" 7 Speaking for the majority, Justice Stewart rejected
Feeney's contention that the law was gender-based and inherently
non-neutral. 5 To accept her arguments, the Court reasoned, would
be to hold that Massachusetts had intentionally absorbed into its civil
service legislation "the panoply of sex-based and assertedlv discriminatorv federal laws" 59 that have precluded all but 1.8% of Mas5o 426 U.S. at 242.
51 99 S. Ct. at 2293.
52 Id.
5

Id.

Id. at 2294. Feeney acknowledged that the veterans' preference statute and the hiring
practices conducted pursuant to it were not invalid per se; she challenged only the absolute
lifetime preference as violative of the equal protection clause. Id. at 2293-94.
55 Id. at 2294. In their concurring opinion, Justices Stevens and 'White reported
that
1,867,000 males were disadvantaged by the preference as compared to 2,954,000 females. Id. at
2297. The opinion is silent as to the date and source of these statistics.
56 Id. at 2285.
57 Id. at 2294.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2294. Some commentators are convinced that veterans' preference laws are, by
their very nature, extensions of federal laws dealing with the military. According to Fleming
'4
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sachusetts women from achieving veteran status. 60 Instead, the
Court declared that the veterans' preference statute "must be
analyzed as is any other neutral law that casts a greater burden upon
61
women as a group than upon men as a group."
The Feeney Court was fully aware of the history of the federal
and Massachusetts laws. 62 Nevertheless, the Court recognized the
Massachusetts legislature's apparent attempt to bring as many military
women as possible within the purview of the veterans' preference
statute. 63 It was conceded that the statute operated "overwhelmingly to the benefit of males." 64 The Court, however, noted that
Massachusetts defined the term "veteran" in gender-neutral language. 65 The majority found it significant that "[w]omen who have
served in official .. .military units during wartime ... have always
been entitled to . . . the preference." 66 Although he admitted that

few women actually benefitted from the preference due to exclusionary military policies and exemption from the draft, 67 Justice Stewart
declared that "discrimination against women in the military is not on
68
trial in this case."
Turning to the nature of discriminatory purpose, Justice Stewart
rejected the foreseeability standard urged by Feeney in favor of a
much narrower definition. 69 The Court did not deny that foreseeability of the consequences of legislative action was relevant to a
finding of discriminatory intent: "[c]ertainly, when the adverse conse-

and Shanor, "veterans' preference statutes by definition incorporate a long history of express
gender discrimination in the military. In that sense, such statutes are essentially no more

gender-neutral than would be a pre-nineteenth amendment statute granting public employment
references to registered voters."
mented:

Fleming & Shanor, supra note 1, at 25-26. Blumberg com-

The difference in numbers between male and female veterans is directly attributable to federal government discrimination in the armed forces . . . .The effect of
prior de jure discrimination on the operation of the preference will persist until all
those women denied equal armed services opportunity have departed from the
labor force.
Blumberg, DeFacto and DeJure Sex Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause; A Re-

consideration of the Veterans' Preference in Public Employment, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 46-47
(1977). See also Anthony v. Mass., 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976).
60 99 S. Ct. at 2291.
61 Id. at 2295.
62 Id. at 2290-92.
63 Id. at 2296.
Id. at 2285.

Id. at 2296.
6 Id. at 2290.
67 Id. at 2290-91.
" Id. at 2295.
69 Id. at 2296.
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quences of a law . . . are as inevitable as the gender-based consequences of ch. 31 § 23, a strong inference that the adverse effects
were desired can reasonably be drawn." 70 The majority, however,
held that the inference did not constitute proof where the impact is
71
an "unavoidable consequence" of a legitimate legislative policy.
Thus, Justice Stewart declared that " 'discriminatory purpose' " implied a conscious choice by the legislature of a particular course of
action selected " 'because of' " not " 'in spite of,' " its adverse impact
on a particular group. 72 In the Court's opinion, Feeney failed to
introduce evidence sufficient to link the veterans' preference statute
to a discriminatory legislative purpose as required by Davis.73 In
upholding the Massachusetts veterans' preference law, Justice Stewart
stated that "Itlhe distinction made by [the Massachusetts statute] is . . .
quite simply between veterans and nonveterans, not between men
74
and women."
In a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall argued
that the legislature's selection of such a severely restrictive scheme
could not reasonably be considered gender-neutral 75 and that the articulated governmental objectives were insufficient to justify the statute's effect on women. 76 Pointing out that veterans are permitted
to invoke the preference repeatedly throughout working life, Justice
Marshall concluded that the statute was clearly overinclusive since it
makes benefits available to veterans whose need for readjustment assistance has dissipated. 77 Similarly, the state's interest in encouraging military service was unconvincing. Not only was the benefit extended to draftees as well as volunteers, but there was no evidence
showing that enlistees were motivated by the possibility of obtaining
the veterans' preference. 78 Finally, the state's interest in rewarding
veterans was insufficient to justify the price exacted from "a class long
. subject to employment discrimination." 79 Justice Marshall ad'0 Id. at 2296 n.25. The majority held that an inference was only a "'working tool, not a
synonym for proof." Id. Marshall, dissenting, contended that when a Court is probing the subjective motivations of a legislature, inference is generally the only tool available. Id. at 2298. He
pointed out that the Court had often examined "the degree, inevitability, and foreseeability of
any disproportionate impact as well as the alternatives reasonably available." Id.
71
72

Id.
Id. at 2296.

73 Id. at 2297.
74

Id.

75 Id. at 2299.
76 Id. at 2300.
77 Id.
78

Id.

79 Id. at 2300-01.
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vocated the adoption of a less discriminatory means of rewarding veterans which would not exclude women from upper level civil service
positions. 80
Although the Feeney majority chose to take a simplistic view of
the facts, Davis does not preclude a more detailed analysis of the
issues. In Davis, the Court stated that a discriminatory purpose must
be shown; 8 ' however, "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often
' 2
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts."
The Feeney Court defined "discriminatory purpose" so narrowly 83 that nothing less than an explicit declaration of discriminatory
intent by the legislature would meet the definition. In so doing, the
Court declined to make the "sensitive inquiry" 8 4 into objective evidence of discriminatory intent which was suggested by Davis and
held to be proper in Arlington Heights. The adoption of a "singularly
myopic view" 8 5 of the facts enabled the majority to avoid applying a
standard of review consistent with Arlington Heights.
The Court's reliance on Davis appears to be misplaced, for that
case can be distinguished from Feeney on several points. In Davis,
the police department actively sought black applicants, and the percentage of black police recruits was approximately equivalent to the
proportion of blacks in the general population. 86 In Feeney, no affirmative efforts to recruit women for civil service jobs traditionally
held by men were noted. More significantly, the written test used in
Davis was relevant to the legitimate purpose of selecting police recruits with a requisite degree of verbal skill. 87 In contrast, veteran
status has not been demonstrated to be a valid indicator of a candidate's fitness for a civil service position. Therefore, the inclusion of
veteran status in merit selection for civil service positions has little
relevance to the objective of obtaining the most qualified applicants.

80 Id.
81 426 U.S. at 242.
82 Id. The Feeney majority dismissed the utility of any inference which might be drawn
from objective factors, holding that the "'inference simply fail[ed] to ripen into proof." 99 S. Ct.
at 2296 n.25.
83

Id.

at 2296.
U.S. at 266.
99 S. Ct. at 2299.

84 429
85

86 When the Davis case arose, 44% of new police recruits were black. This figure was
proportional to the number of blacks on the police force, and equivalent to the number of 20-29
year old blacks within the area from which recruits were drawn. 426 U.S. at 235.
87 Id. at 246. The Davis Court held that Washington, D.C. was constitutionally permitted to
upgrade the abilities of police officers to communicate orally and in writing where such skills
were necessary to the job. Id.
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Even though the "history of discrimination against women in the
military [was] not on trial," 88 the Court erred by failing to view the
Massachusetts veterans' preference statute in context. Discriminatory
policies which mandated the almost total exclusion of women from
the armed forces, 8 9 coupled with the preference, 90 permanently deprived all but a handful of females of the opportunity to obtain civil
service jobs of interest to male veterans. 91 Military policies which
prevent most females from attaining veteran status, and civil service
policies which reward veteran status cannot be considered separately,
for the latter incorporates the former. "The preference's relation back
to explicitly sex-based [military] classifications indicates that the preference itself should be treated as a sex-based classification .... ."92
In Feeney, the Court abandoned the intolerance of sex-based
generalizations which it had demonstrated since 1971. 93 Reflecting
the perceptions of a large segment of our society, 94 the Justices have
held repeatedly that gender discrimination is unjustifiable in light of
current social realities. In particular, the Court has had little patience
with classifications based on stereotypic gender roles and has struck
down laws which perpetuate "archaic and overbroad generalizations"
about women and their roles. 95

8

99 S. Ct. at 2295.
89 See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
9o See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
91 As of August 2, 1979, data compiled by the Massachusetts Civil Service indicated that for
all grades above six (except for nine) males outnumbered females significantly. In the highest
grades, 30 to 33, there were 23 males, but only 3 females. In the much lower grade of three,
however, there were 37 males and 521 females. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Abstract, Massachusetts Civil Service (generated August 2, 1979).
92 Blumberg, supra note 68, at 51.
9' See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
9 Consciousness of the unfairness of sex discrimination is reflected in the passage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), and the proposal of
the Equal Rights Amendment.
Ironically, the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment in several states appears to have
had a dampening effect on the Court's willingness to apply strict scrutiny in sex discriminiation
cases. "'The obvious reluctance of the Supreme Court to decide whether or not to categorize sex
as 'inherently suspect' apparently originates from an unwillingness to intrude into that area
while the Equal Rights Amendment is pending ratification by the States." Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 989 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
95 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). Justice Blackmun stated in Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975):
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the
Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding.
family ....
Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in the
professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a
desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of
judicial notice.
Id. at 14-15.
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NOTES

By allowing the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute to
stand, the Court has sanctioned a legislative policy which is manifestly insensitive to the condition of modern women and which perpetuates stereotypic assumptions about gender roles. The preference
operates to maintain patterns of sex segregation in employment by
blocking women's access to jobs of interest to men. Consequently,
opportunities for women in the Massachusetts civil service will continue to be largely restricted to low paying, nonprestigious jobs traditionally held by women.
The Feeney Court should have delved more deeply into the facts
of the controversy and analyzed the preference's impact according to
the Arlington Heights standards. 96 Specifically, the Court should
have searched for the discriminatory purpose by examining the relevant "historical background," the "specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged decision," and the "legislative or administrative
history" of the preference. 97 Indeed, Justice Powell's majority opinion in Arlington Heights advocated calling legislators to the witness
stand to "testify concerning the purpose of official actions." 9 8 Had
the Feeney Court applied these standards, it would have been impossible to ignore the history of discrimination against women in the
military 9 9 and in the Massachusetts civil service. 100 The preference's
long legislative history, with its obvious perpetuation of sex-role
stereotypes, would not have escaped the Court's scrutiny. Had the
Court acted according to the Arlington Heights standards, it seems
likely that it would have found the requisite discriminatory
purpose-and likely that it would have ruled for Feeney.
Mechanical application of the Davis intent'
standard, unaccompanied by a bona fide attempt to glean intent from the facts, does
nothing to rectify injustices either against women who are denied
equal employment opportunities or against Massachusetts citizens
who are deprived of civil servants of demonstrated competence. The
application of an intermediate standard of review according to the
Arlington Heights standards 10 2 would have been more consistent with
prior decisions than the Feeney Court's cursory glance at the facts.
The Court would have done a service to Massachusetts women
and rectified an injustice by striking down the Massachusetts vet429 U.S. at 267-68.

97Id.
98 Id. at 268.
99 See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
100 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
101 See notes 40 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
102 429 U.S. at 267-68.
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erans' preference statute. Unless finders of fact can penetrate the
thought processes of lawmakers, it is almost inevitable that outward
manifestations of intent-such as those discussed in Arlington
Heights-be considered. 103
It is also difficult to accept Massachusetts' justification for the
preference in light of Justice Marshall's reasoning. Under his
scrutiny, the preference in its present form emerges as the anachronism it is. 104 Plainly, the state's articulated purposes in enacting
the statute are insufficient to justify the effect wrought on Massachusetts women.
By upholding an absolute veterans' preference, the Feeney Court
sanctioned the male-dominated hierarchy as it exists in the Massachusetts civil service, and as it will continue to exist unless altered
by legislative action. It is surely a worthy state purpose to reward
veterans and to ease their transition into civilian life. Less drastic
means, however, are available to accomplish this purpose. 105 The
method chosen by Massachusetts and sanctioned by the Supreme
Court exacts too high a price from female citizens.
Lynn Williams Dischler

Ct. at 2300.
See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.
105 In his dissent, Justice Marshall suggests replacing the absolute preference with "a point
preference system ... or an absolute preference for a limited duration." 99 S. Ct. at 2300.
103 99 S.
104

